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THE SUBMARINE AS A CASE STUDY IN TRANSFORMATION
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE INVESTMENT
James H. Patton, Jr.
It’s not the strongest that survive, but the ones most responsive to change.
CHARLES DARWIN
The Department of Defense is sometimes guilty of glomming onto a buzzword or
catchy phrase and wearing it thin. “Revolution in Military Affairs,” or RMA (a
term derived, incidentally, from Soviet military writings concerning a “military-
technical revolution”) certainly came close to crossing that threshold. Today, the
word “transformation”—a marvelously useful and intellectually descriptive
word—could similarly be at risk of exhaustion.
When such a phrase represents an apparently desirable property, there exists
a tendency to attach that phrase to every conceivable defense system, thereby en-
hancing the program’s attractiveness to senior decision makers. “Transforma-
tion,” defined by the Department of Defense as a process shaping the way future
wars are fought, including elements of concepts, technology, and organizations,
clearly also includes the contemporary adoption of the Global Positioning Sys-
tem, precision weapons, and the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) to guided
missile submarine (SSGN) conversions—just as naval aviation and the Blitz-
krieg were transformational when they were first introduced.
Though these programs may not be so abrupt or dramatic as to warrant the
term “revolutionary,” it is important to note that there is also a significant evolu-
tion in military affairs under way, in that certain platforms and systems are
adapting to changing conditions. Throughout the twentieth century and to the
present, the submarine has been a prime example of
evolution, largely owing to its inherent flexibility and
sometimes unintentional nonmission specificity. For
example, many who were not submariners thought
that the U.S. submarine force had lost its raison d’être
when the Cold War ended, which was not the case.
The following will show, therefore, that there has al-
ways been a next “most important mission” for these
warships.
THE SUBMARINE AS A CASE STUDY
The U.S. submarine has a history of adaptation since
its incorporation into the fleet in 1900. In a macro-
scopic sense, the figure below graphically depicts how
Captain James H. Patton, Jr. (Retired), a 1960 graduate
of the Naval Academy, has served on seven nuclear sub-
marines, commanding USS Pargo (SSN 650), with sev-
eral associated shore tours. Upon retiring from the War
Gaming Department of the Naval War College in 1985,
Captain Patton founded Submarine Tactics and Tech-
nology, Inc., serving as its president. He has been a con-
sultant to more than thirty major corporations and
government agencies on matters of submarine stealth
warfare, which included three years as technical consul-
tant to Paramount Pictures for the script and produc-
tion of the film The Hunt for Red October. Captain
Patton has also served as the undersea/stealth warfare
editor for Defense Science magazine, lectured exten-
sively on defense, and written for many professional
journals.
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the submarine’s most important missions have continually changed in a hun-
dred years. It is significant that it also alludes to how, at any one time, the subma-
rine was likely to have current missions of high priority, missions of waning
importance, and missions of increasing gravity. In almost every case, the time
constants of these changes were shorter than the life cycle of the existing plat-
form. To avoid obsolescence, it was sometimes necessary for extreme variant re-
quirements to be made technically (and tactically) during a ship’s (and crew’s)
lifetime. As a result it can be safely said that no U.S. submarine has ever been em-
ployed for its designed purpose, and no commanding officer ever performed
that for which he was trained.
A partial list of examples for platform employment:
• S-Boats designed in the 1920s for coastal defense and fleet boats designed
in the 1930s as battle-fleet scouts found themselves in 1942 as distantly
deployed commerce raiders.
• The Skipjack class, designed to provide terminal guidance for nuclear-tipped
Regulus cruise missiles fired from a large fleet of Halibut-class SSGNs,
never materialized because of the advent of the Polaris ballistic missile.
• The Thresher/Permit-class SSNs, designed to operate in pairs while firing
rocket-propelled nuclear depth charges at distant Soviet subs, never carried out
that mission, due to the failure of Sesco, a secure acoustic communications
system needed for information exchange and the triangulation of sonar
bearings for target localization.











THE “MOST IMPORTANT” SUBMARINE MISSION
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• Escorting carrier battle groups was the justification for the high speed of
the Los Angeles class in the late 1960s. Even though submarines were used
in direct support of battle groups in a 1977 Pacific Fleet exercise (RIMPAC),
and a Navy warfare publication was published in 1980 based on further
experimentation in RIMPACs 1978 and 1979, this mission was not routinely
assigned until after the Cold War ended, when many of the class were being
decommissioned.
With this sort of historical precedent, one can appreciate the wisdom behind
the decision to widen the mission range of the Virginia class so that it could be
somewhat better acclimated to joint operations in shallow coastal waters rather
than, as some had insisted, optimized as specifically a “littoral combat sub-
marine.” There have been few failures in U.S. submarine design, but the designs
that did fail were those that were overoptimized for a narrow mission set,
thereby losing their intrinsic adaptability.
A traditional approach to the kind of anti-access (AA) and area-denial (AD)
scenario likely to be encountered by U.S. naval forces in the littorals would be an
“outside-in rollback” of these maritime AA/AD networks.1 However, when a key
element of the forces is entirely capable of passing directly through (over/under)
these networks, much as F-117s and B-2s have routinely gone “right downtown”
before air defenses have been degraded, it makes enormous sense to do just that.
Stealthy aircraft were and are technologically transformational, but it is tactically
transformational to employ a characteristic of an existing system (i.e., a sub-
marine’s intrinsic ability to covertly penetrate AA/AD defenses) for a different
reason. In a previous life, submarines penetrated AA/AD defenses to collect in-
telligence or engage “bastioned” Soviet SSBNs. They can now do it actively, to
take down AA/AD measures from the inside out, enabling other forces to enter
the contested area. Here once again, the submarine has adapted to a different set
of tasks than those for which it was originally created.
There are many factors that go into creating a long-lived weapon system ca-
pable of such unexpected adaptations. There is certainly the importance of se-
lecting flexible, intelligent, and innovative personnel to man it, and there is the
indispensable requirement to instill early in its crew a solid baseline of training
that includes a “common culture” and provide continuous training as newer
employments and missions evolve. Internal hardware, electronics, and software
can, of course, be upgraded, facilitated by incorporating into the initial design
considerable “space and weight reserved,” but there is a limit to just how much
something like a nuclear submarine (built now with fuel to last more than thirty
years) can be “reinvented” during its lifetime. Certain attributes, stealth being a
primary example, must be engineered in at the beginning and therefore have
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historically appeared initially to be far in excess of that which was considered ad-
equate. However, continual component improvement and evolution of superior
maintenance procedures can not only maintain “as-built” levels of emissions
controls but actually improve upon them. For example, submarines decommis-
sioned over the last decade or so left service significantly quieter than when they
first sailed a quarter-century earlier.
Sometimes pure serendipity has enabled submarine platforms to age and
adapt gracefully. When, in the 1930s, it was desired to design a submarine to op-
erate with and scout for the main battle fleet, it had to make economically at least
eighteen knots on the surface. Since maximum surface speed ultimately dictates
the length of a ship’s hull, by the laws of hydrodynamics, this resulted in a nearly
three-hundred-foot behemoth (for its time) displacing 1,800 tons. By compari-
son, the then-existing “gold standard” of submarines—the German Type VIIC,
which did so much damage early in World War II—displaced only about seven
hundred tons. The U.S. Gato-class fleet boat was able easily to carry enough diesel
fuel to traverse the Pacific and have significant time on station, while the Type
VIIC literally had to carry fuel in its bilges and conduct hazardous at-sea
refuelings if it was to operate in the western Atlantic. Perhaps even more impor-
tantly, the fleet boat had room onboard to incorporate equipment developments
and improvements in radar, sonar, and electronic intercept equipment while the
small U-boat did not, significantly contributing to its rapid obsolescence and
high loss rates. It was not until 1943 that Germany rectified the U-boat’s short-
comings and began design and construction of the Type XXI—a marvelous sub-
marine that set the standard for postwar U.S. and Soviet designs. However, it did
not arrive in numbers soon enough to have an appreciable effect on the war.
Similar design imbalances were seen between U.S. and Soviet submarines.
Greater concern about radiation and other safety issues made American nuclear
submarines far more reliable than their Soviet counterparts, with less radiation
exposure. Marginal thermodynamic considerations and assumptions that these
subs would always be operated in cold arctic waters made Soviet Type 2 nuclear
submarines (e.g., Charlies, Victors) virtually inoperable in areas such as the Ara-
bian Sea or Persian Gulf, while the engineering plants of all classes of U.S. SSNs
operated superbly in waters of very high temperatures as well as in cold climates.
Clearly, the margin of superiority demonstrated by U.S. submarines over
their Soviet counterparts played a key role in the winning of the Cold War. As re-
cently as the late 1990s the Defense Science Board called the SSN the “crown
jewel” of the U.S. armed forces. This prompted a two-year “Submarine Payload
and Sensors” program by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to in-
vestigate what adaptations would be necessary to maintain that prestigious title
through the next two decades. A finding of this program was that the new Virginia
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class currently being built would need to be “modular” in its payload options
and that the magnitude of such payloads would probably increase by a factor of
ten. In this sense, the soon-to-be Ohio-class SSGNs (converted from SSBNs in
excess of Cold War requirements) can be viewed as “bridges” to what fully devel-
oped Virginias will become.
Now that the largest class of U.S. nuclear submarines (the Los Angeles and its
sisters) is drawing toward its end, it is instructional to review some of the good
and not so good elements of their initial design. Built to accompany carrier battle
groups, they needed to be fast, and they were, through a doubling of the shaft
horsepower of their predecessors. Each successive class (after the first multiple-
ship class [Skate]) improved access and habitability over its predecessor with re-
sulting improvements in morale and reliability not easily measured in the initial
investment. The engineering spaces of the Los Angeles class were well designed
for easy access to equipment. Significant free-flooding volume forward of the
pressure hull permitted installation in later units of the dramatically successful
twelve-tube Tomahawk vertical launch system. However, to enhance speed by re-
ducing hydrodynamic drag, the sail of the ship was made relatively small. As a
result, it had fewer masts and antennas and was not “ice hardened,” reducing its
value as an information systems research (ISR) collection platform and sacrific-
ing ability to perform some arctic missions. Because of the much larger engi-
neering spaces, the “front end” of the ship was actually smaller than that of the
class it replaced, to keep overall length reasonable, reducing habitability and
somewhat constraining systems growth potential (although this was fortunately
counterbalanced by dramatic improvements in computer capacity per unit vol-
ume). Also, the hydrodynamics of the ship are such that the ship is not easy to
control at speeds of one to three knots, making it difficult to deploy and recover
special operation forces (SOF)—which has become an increasingly important
mission.2 All shortcomings have been addressed in the Virginia design.
While a brighter future is foreseen for better and even more flexible
multimission submarines, the reality of force structure is out of phase with this
vision by 180 degrees. From a Cold War level of one hundred or so attack sub-
marines, the present level is about fifty and is falling—in spite of the fact that
SSN taskings by fleet and national commanders have essentially doubled. Be-
cause of this submarine shortage, existing ships must now transit at much
higher sustained speeds than originally planned, which threatens the life span of
their reactors. During the last decade, the SSN has become the Tomahawk land-
attack cruise-missile launch platform of choice. In Operation DESERT STORM,
SSNs launched 5 percent of the missiles, while during IRAQI FREEDOM the num-
ber was more than 30 percent. This is not to argue that the sheer number of plat-
forms is the critical variable. As Rear Admiral Jerry Holland, USN (Retired),
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(Holland served on CNO staff as director for Strategic and Theater Nuclear
Weapons, as Deputy Director for Space Command and Control, and as Deputy
Director for Operations, Joint Staff) pointed out regarding the Skate-class SSN
of the late 1950s, an “economy-sized” Nautilus follow-on was operationally dis-
appointing and difficult to maintain.3 It is true that “quantity does have a quality
all its own,” but in order to adapt and to transform there must be a nontrivial
level of quality, robust design, and architectural flexibility resident in the initial
version of a major weapons system.
By virtue of what history may note as remarkable speed and adroitness, the
submarine and its crew once again have adapted to a different set of operational
requirements. From essentially a “lone wolf ” a decade ago, the submarine is now
nearly universally accepted as a key node within network-centric warfare, the
purveyor of “undersea dominance,” and an essential element of Sea Power 21.
Disbelievers need only review the capabilities tested and demonstrated in exer-
cise GIANT SHADOW of early 2003, where an operational SSBN, USS Florida
(SSBN 728), simulating an SSGN on counterterrorist and counter–weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) operations, launched a large autonomous undersea
vehicle (AUV) to plot a minefield, landed and supported special operation
forces, exploited ISR from a small unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), analyzed soil
samples returned by SOF on the AUV, and launched two Tomahawk missiles to
simulate the destruction of a terrorist WMD facility. An additional exercise,
SILENT HAMMER, more fully developed and demonstrated SSGN potential by
employing USS Georgia (SSBN 729).
One of the less publicized capabilities of the SSGN will exploit the virtually
unlimited electrical power and air conditioning capability of all nuclear sub-
marines, coupled with extensive space and manpower, to provide an extensive
capability to absorb and process huge amounts of data from on- and off-board
sensors and ISR platforms (such as Global Hawk, HAIRY BUFFALO, joint surveil-
lance and target attack radar system, etc.). This data will be processed and fused
within the ship to produce manageable quantities of information, analyzed
onboard by humans, then distilled into knowledge. This grapes-to-wine-to-
brandy process will permit an SSGN with the proper interfaces, such as the Dis-
tributed Common Ground System–Navy (DCGS-N), to become a vital theater
node, transforming vast quantities of downloaded data from multiple sources
into small nuggets of knowledge that are easily distributed (through a vastly
smaller diameter “pipe”) via Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
(SIPRNET) to other users globally. It should also be clear, to those who think
deeply about such matters, that the SSGN program is far more than just a way to
extend the operational viability of declining SSBNs; it is a pilot program to
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investigate just what the Virginia class should become when it has fully evolved
in ten years.
However, with the world situation becoming increasingly unstable, there are
more than one or two places where a credible, actual, or virtual U.S. presence
must be claimed or maintained. Therefore, to sustain persistently unseen assets
around the world, there is a force-level number that must be maintained. This
number is significantly more than thirty, the level resulting from a one-per-year
build rate of thirty three-year-design-life hulls, when operating tempos, mainte-
nance, and transits are factored in. All post–Cold War submarine force level
studies by several agencies indicate an enduring need for numbers of SSNs far in
excess of what can be sustained by a one-per-year build rate.
IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTMENT
An SSN is unique. Not only does just one submarine represent a credible mili-
tary force, but it is also capable of surviving and operating independently any-
where in the world, including ocean areas as shallow as twenty fathoms, to which
access has been restricted or denied to other platforms. Two or so weeks out of
home port and an SSN can be anywhere in the world. These operational traits
truly make it a desirable asset for multimission tasking, but even more impor-
tant are the top-level characteristics and design specifications that have allowed
it to demonstrate repeatedly that degree of adaptability. These specifications
have included reserving space and weight that permits yet-unenvisioned equip-
ment to be installed to counter now unimagined situations, and an insistence
that core enabling characteristics such as stealth never be compromised.4 Other
essential steps being taken to enhance flexibility are an expansion into other
combat system areas of the extremely successful Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion
(ARCI) program, in which dramatic improvements are routinely and affordably
incorporated into sonar systems, and a push toward weapon system modularity
for the Virginia class, the SSGN, and subsequent classes.
Similarly, since reduced levels of detection, tracking, and weapons homing
resulting from incorporation of low observable or very low observable technol-
ogies and techniques have shown to enhance dramatically the survivability of
aircraft and surface ships, a reduction in design requirements of subsequent
platforms should be imposed only with the greatest trepidation. Whatever
new mission or tasking received will certainly be better accomplished, and the
platform will be more survivable, with improved mitigation or control of its
signatures.
Other mentioned submarine traits should also be objectively examined for
possible applicability and incorporation into what one would wish to be inher-
ently adaptable in the future. Are margins to grow, ability to gain access, and
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persistent presence desirable attributes of the CVN-21 carrier, the DDX
destroyer, Global Hawk, joint unarmed combat air system, and various space ve-
hicles and other intelligence systems? The question should certainly be asked.
Platforms, procedures, or even people do not have to be revolutionary to be
transformational. Perhaps a different word using the same semantic root better
captures the intent—that these things be transformationable—designed, built,
and maintained so as to be readily adaptable to inevitable changes. If this is
properly done, survival will be enhanced not only in present and future budget
wars but in present and future shooting wars.
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